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BOOK REVIEW
SEEKING PRIVACY: EXAMINING A ROLE FOR THE
FIDUCIARY IN PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004).
REVIEWED BY MARCEY L. GRIGSBY*
The time will come when we are
well known for our inclinations, our
predelictions, our proclivities, and our wants.
We will be classified, profiled, categorized,
and our every click will be watched.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, consumers faced unsettling news about the vulnerabil-
ity of their personal information.2  In the span of just a few months,
several pillars of corporate America including, among others, Ci-
tigroup, Bank of America, UPS, Ameritrade, MCI, and Time
Warner, announced they had lost, misplaced, or in some way ex-
posed to theft or unauthorized access the personal information of
tens of millions of Americans.3  Perhaps still more disturbing, con-
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2006.
1. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE IN-
FORMATION AGE 26 (2004) (quoting Jim Sterne, WHAT MAKES PEOPLE CLICK: ADVERTIS-
ING ON THE WEB 179 (1997)).
2. See Joseph Nocera, Data Theft: How to Fix the Mess, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2005, at
C1 (reporting that the fear among consumers about the security of their personal infor-
mation is “palpable” in the wake of announcements of recent data breaches).
3. See M.P. Dunleavey, Don’t Let Data Theft Happen to You, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005,
at C7 (reporting on breaches at Citigroup, Bank of America, ChoicePoint, Inc., and
LexisNexis); Jonathan Krim, Ubiquitous Technology, Bad Practices Drive Up Data Theft,
WASH. POST, June 22, 2005, at D1 (reporting that credit card processing company Card-
Systems Solutions, Inc., housed 40 million credit card numbers that may have been
obtained by hackers); Robert Manor, Records Lost on 4 Million; UPS Says It Can’t Find
CitiFinancial Tapes, CHI. TRIB., June 7, 2005, at C1 (reporting breaches at Bank of
America, United Parcel Service, Ameritrade Holding Corp., MCI, Inc., Time Warner,
1031
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sumers learned that companies they had never heard of or even
knew existed had been collecting and reselling vast amounts of
their personal information,4 and that one of the largest of these
companies, ChoicePoint, Inc., had sold consumer data to identity
thieves posing as legitimate customers.5  The data that was exposed
in these incidents included highly sensitive personal information,
such as social security and credit card numbers,6 names, ages, credit
ratings, the names of account beneficiaries and dependents,7 ad-
dresses, telephone numbers, online banking user names,8 customer
account numbers and payment histories,9 and a general category of
unspecified “confidential data.”10  The information about these
data breaches became public because a California law that was
passed in 2003 requires companies to inform the state’s consumers
when their personal information has been compromised.11  With-
out that law, it is possible that these incidents would never have
come to light.12
In the course of our daily lives, we have become used to provid-
ing personal information about ourselves to the companies with
Inc., Citigroup’s CitiFinancial division, as well as data thefts or losses at Polo Ralph
Lauren Corp., Boston College, ChoicePoint, and banks, credit bureaus, and universi-
ties); Jonathan Peterson, U.S. Senate Panel Tackles Identity Theft; Members of the Banking
Committee Seek New Regulations to Govern Information Brokers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at
C1 (reporting that hackers obtained the credit card information of hundreds of
thousands of people from shoe retailer DSW, Inc.).  Between February 2005 and Janu-
ary 2006, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a consumer advocacy group, reported the
occurrence of 114 major data breaches, affecting about 52 million Americans. See Tom
Zeller, Jr., Waking Up to Recurring ID Nightmares, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at C3.
4. See Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 381 (2003); Krim, supra note 3.
5. See id.
6. See id. (reporting that nearly 50 million consumer credit card accounts were
exposed to security breaches in the first half of 2005).
7. See Manor, supra note 3.
8. See Michael Hiltzik, This Time, Security Breach Is Personal, L.A. TIMES, June 30,
2005, at C1.
9. See Manor, supra note 3.
10. See David Colker, Low-Tech Methods Used in Data Theft, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2005, at C1.
11. See Nocera, supra note 2.
12. See id. (noting that prior to the California law’s passage, “there were plenty of
examples of hacked data,” but that the public simply did not learn about them); Evan
Perez, Identity Theft Puts Pressure on Data Sellers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2005, at B1 (report-
ing that the California law “is the reason why ChoicePoint’s fraud case came to light”).
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which we do business.13  We give out information about ourselves
— including our names, addresses, telephone numbers, social se-
curity numbers, credit card information, or our personal prefer-
ences — when we make purchases on the Internet or in a store,14
use ATM cards,15 pay bills,16 sign up for frequent-flier or retail re-
wards programs,17 obtain driver’s licenses,18 apply for jobs19 and
13. See Bergelson, supra note 4, at 381 (“In the course of our everyday activities, we
routinely reveal our names, addresses, and social security numbers as well as our finan-
cial decisions, health problems, tastes, habits, political and religious affiliations, sexual
orientation, hobbies, and love affairs.”).
14. See, e.g., Macy’s, My Account – Register/Create Account, https://www.macys.
com (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (listing the benefits of registering with Macy’s online,
including, among others, the ability to: “shop at over 400 stores nationwide and . . . at
macys.com”; view and manage a Macy’s credit card account; store billing and shipping
information; create and share a “Wish List” with family and friends; and sign up to
receive personalized e-mails); Barnes & Noble, Account, http://www.bn.com (last vis-
ited Feb. 12, 2006) (offering registered users the ability to view their transaction histo-
ries going back up to eighteen months; store multiple shipping addresses; store
multiple credit card numbers for use in making future purchases; and create and main-
tain Wish Lists).
15. Details of ATM transactions — including the ATM location and amount with-
drawn or deposited — are recorded by banks and appear on account holders’ online
and paper bank statements. See, e.g., Bank of America, Online Banking Demo, http://
www.bankofamerica.com/onlinebanking/demo2/model/index.cfm (last visited Feb.
12, 2006).
16. See, e.g., Sprint, Manage Your Account, http://www.sprintpcs.com (last visited
Mar. 21, 2006) (offering online bill payment to its PCS Wireless customers, including
one-time bill payment from customers’ checking accounts, which requires customers to
enter their bank account numbers and bank routing numbers; also, requiring custom-
ers to enter their cell phone numbers to log in to their online accounts).
17. See Delta Air Lines, SkyMiles, http://www.delta.com/skymiles (last visited Mar.
21, 2006).  Delta Air Lines, like other major airlines, offers a robust rewards program
that allows customers to accumulate “miles” for Delta travel. See id. Delta’s provision of
SkyMiles benefits is dependent on the collection and storage of members’ personal
data, including their travel history, travel preferences, and miles redemption activity.
See id. Delta also offers a SkyMiles credit card through American Express, a feature
typical of airline rewards programs and one that provides the airline with even more
access to its members’ personal information, including their credit card transactions
generally. See id. Rewards programs are also common among supermarket chains,
drug stores, and other retailers. See, e.g., Albertsons, Save, http://www.albertsons.com
(last visited Mar. 21, 2006); CVS/Pharmacy, CVS ExtraCare, http://www.cvs.com/extra
care (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).  Consumers who hold a Gap, Banana Republic, or Old
Navy credit card may now earn rewards points for purchases made at any one of the
three retailers, which are owned by the same parent company. See The Gap, GapCard,
http://www.gap.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).
18. See, e.g., NY State Department of Motor Vehicles, Proofs of Identity and Date
of Birth Required to Apply for a Driver’s License, a Learner Permit or a Non-Driver
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loans,20 or even move about.21  Indeed, nearly everything we do
seems to generate data about us.22  The companies that receive this
information routinely use it to learn more about us, create new
products and services, or send us personalized advertisements.  But
the information does not always stop there because the companies
with whom we have done business do not always keep the informa-
tion for themselves.  They often sell it to companies like Choice-
Point, Inc., or Acxiom Corp., two of a handful of behemoth “data
aggregators”23 or “data brokers”24 that are in the business of collect-
ing, compiling, analyzing, and reselling billions of private records
on Americans.25  Although companies have been collecting per-
Photo ID Card, http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/idlicense.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2006)
(listing the personal information required for persons wishing to obtain and renew a
New York driver’s license).
19. See Nuala Moran, Human resources breaks free from its paper chains, FIN. TIMES,
May 7, 2003, at 2 (discussing the growth of Internet-based job applications and recruit-
ment, and the ways in which companies are applying database marketing technologies
to recruitment).
20. See, e.g., Access Group, Welcome to Account Access, http://www.accessgroup.
com (last visited Mar. 21, 2006) (requiring loan customers to enter their social security
numbers in order to log in to view account information).
21. See, e.g., Christopher Caldwell, A Pass on Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 17,
2005, at 13 (discussing privacy concerns raised by automatic toll-paying devices on the
roads); Sewell Chan, M.T.A. Collects Some ZIP Codes When MetroCard Buyers Use Credit
Cards, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2005, at B4 (discussing New York City Transit’s collection of
zipcodes from riders who purchase their subway cards at vending machines).
22. Jessica Litman, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? Information Pri-
vacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (2000); Joe Burris, Every move you
make; It’s getting harder to cover your tracks as even the most everyday activities – from running a
Google search to using the E-Z Pass lane – leave a lengthy digital trail, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 6,
2006, at 1C (“[M]ost people leave a digital trail of personal information behind as they
go about their daily life [sic], using an ATM or a grocery savings club card or logging on
to their e-mail accounts.”).
23. See Nocera, supra note 2.
24. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center West
Coast Office, After the Breach: How Secure and Accurate is Consumer Information
Held By ChoicePoint and Other Data Aggregators?, Testimony Before the California
State Banking, Finance and Insurance Committee, available at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/choicepoint/casban3.30.05.html (last modified Apr. 5, 2005).
25. See Perez, supra note 12; Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Privacy Eroding, Bit by Byte,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2004, at E01 (naming Acxiom Corp. as “[o]ne of the leading
aggregators of personal information”).  ChoicePoint describes its business as the “iden-
tification, retrieval, storage, analysis and delivery of data.”  ChoicePoint, Inc., http://
www.choicepoint.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2005). ChoicePoint’s customers — to whom
it sells this information — include government and law enforcement agencies as well as
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sonal information for a long time,26 the growth of the Internet and
online commerce, where the exchange of personal information is
“part of the price of admission,” has dramatically increased both
the volume of personal information available for collection and the
rate at which it can be collected.27  This has also increased the pos-
sibilities for theft, as the recent data breaches have illustrated.  Cor-
porate America, including ChoicePoint, Acxiom, and other
information brokers, has cashed in on the growing market for such
information, reaping the rewards while consumers pay the price
with their privacy.28
The ChoicePoint and other breaches of 2005 have galvanized
privacy advocates and consumer groups nationwide.29  Consumers
and privacy advocates have expressed alarm not only at the data-
theft siege of 2005,30 but at the growth of the consumer data indus-
try generally31 and the powerlessness of consumers to control what
happens to their personal information.32  Skeptical of self-regula-
tory solutions because of the amount of money at stake,33 they are
companies in the marketing, retail, insurance, financial, legal, telecommunications,
and nonprofit sectors. Id.
26. See O’Harrow, supra note 25.
27. Id.
28. See Nocera, supra note 2 (“Most victims of identity theft have no idea how it
happened.  Their data is out there in the ether of the Internet or on the computers of
companies they’ve never heard of.”).  ChoicePoint reported nearly a billion dollars in
revenue in its fiscal year ending 2004.  See CHOICEPOINT, INC., CHOICEPOINT 2004 AN-
NUAL REPORT 14, available at http://library.corporate-ir.net/library/95/952/95293/
items/143458/2004annual.pdf. (last visited Mar. 23, 2006) [hereinafter CHOICEPOINT
2004 ANNUAL REPORT].  Acxiom reported revenue of $1.223 billion in its 2005 fiscal
year, an increase of 21% over the previous year. AXCIOM CORP., ACXIOM ANNUAL RE-
PORT 2005, available at http://www.acxiom.com/default.aspx?ID=1639&DisplayID=18
(last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
29. See Colker, supra note 10 (reporting that the ChoicePoint breach “ignite[ed] a
national furor”); Hoofnagle, supra note 24.
30. See Krim, supra note 3.
31. See O’Harrow, supra note 25.
32. See Nocera, supra note 2 (reporting that “[t]here is an uneasy sense that peo-
ple simply do not have control of their own financial information”).
33. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 10, at 2 (quoting a privacy advocate as questioning
whether these data gathering companies “will really change their attitude without tough
new laws and a lot of lawsuits”); Krim, supra note 3 (quoting U.S. Senator Dianne Fein-
stein (D-Cal.) as saying that the CardSystems incident “is a clear sign” that self-regula-
tion is failing”); Perez, supra note 12 (quoting the executive director of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) as saying that ChoicePoint’s breach “. . . ends the
discussion on whether self-regulation works”).  ChoicePoint agreed to a $15 million
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seeking legal and federal regulatory changes that will hold data ag-
gregators accountable and force them to better protect the per-
sonal information they have collected.34
In The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information
Age, Daniel J. Solove, a law professor and leading expert on per-
sonal information privacy, provides a detailed examination of the
history of the collection and use of personal data by companies in
the private sector and a thorough discussion of the disturbing im-
plications such practices raise for personal privacy.35  He proposes
that the law recognize a fiduciary relationship between those com-
panies that collect personal information and the individuals whose
information they collect.36  Doing so, he argues, would subject
these companies to heightened fiduciary obligations and, in turn,
greater legal liability when data is lost, exposed to theft, or
mishandled.
Part II of this book review summarizes Professor Solove’s
description of the threat posed by the collection of personal infor-
mation, the inadequacy of existing law to deal with the threat, and
his proposal that the law should hold those companies that collect
and use personal information in a fiduciary relationship with the
individuals who provide that information.  Part III traces the origins
of fiduciary law and the analytical framework that governs the rec-
ognition of fiduciary relationships.  Part IV analyzes Solove’s propo-
sal within that framework and concludes that it is unsupported by
settlement with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in connection with the 2005 data
breaches.  Arshad Mohammed, Record Fine for Data Breach; ChoicePoint Case Spotlighted ID
Theft, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2006, at D1 (reporting that one-third of the settlement, or $5
million, was earmarked to reimburse affected consumers).  The ChoicePoint fine was
the largest ever imposed by the FTC and was hailed by some privacy advocates. See id.
It amounts, however, to a negligible percentage of ChoicePoint’s 2004 revenue. See
CHOICEPOINT 2004 ANNUAL REPORT supra note 28.
34. See, e.g., Hoofnagle, supra note 24 (director of EPIC discussing the Choice-
Point breach and providing a framework for reforming the commercial data broker
industry).
35. See generally SOLOVE, supra note 1.  Solove’s book was published just two
months before the ChoicePoint announcement and is directly relevant to the concerns
raised by it.  Solove’s prescient treatment of the issues confirms his place at the leading
edge of the battle for consumer privacy.  Solove also addresses threats to personal pri-
vacy stemming from access to public records and government access to the information
residing in private and public sector databases. Id. at 127, 165.  Those topics, however,
are beyond the scope of this review.
36. See id. at 103.  “Radical” is Solove’s own description for this proposal. See id.
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fiduciary law and unworkable because it would effectively eliminate
the very notion of arm’s length dealing between parties to ordinary
commercial transactions.  Part V concludes that recognizing a fidu-
ciary relationship in this context is not an appropriate solution to
the privacy problems posed by the personal information market-
place.  We may well remember 2005 as the year of the personal data
breach.37  But we are unlikely to remember it as the year when a
solution was born.
II. THE GROWING THREAT TO PERSONAL PRIVACY
A. Digital Dossiers
The emergence of powerful computer databases and the In-
ternet has allowed the companies with which consumers do busi-
ness every day, as well as data brokers like ChoicePoint with whom
consumers rarely interact directly, to efficiently collect, store, and
transfer vast amounts of detailed information about us.38  This in-
formation is captured from many sources, including our ATM
cards, pre-paid calling cards, frequent shopper cards, credit cards,39
and other publicly available sources.40  The Internet has exponen-
tially41 increased both the supply and demand of personal informa-
tion42 by making it easier and more cost-efficient for companies to
collect, buy, and sell personal information.43  It has also made it
possible to capture increasingly detailed data about individuals, in-
cluding information that was not previously available for collection
at all, such as demographic44 and psychographic data45 as well as
37. See Krim, supra note 3.
38. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 18. See also Bergelson, supra note 4, at 381 (“The
computer revolution has dramatically affected our privacy by making it possible to re-
cord, store, and process every scrap of personal information we leave behind.”).
39. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 1.
40. See CHOICEPOINT 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 7.
41. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 16.
42. See id. at 22. See also Bergelson, supra note 4, at 382 (noting that billions of
dollars are generated each year from the sale of mailing lists alone).
43. See Pamela Samuelson, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? Privacy As
Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2000).
44. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 19 (e.g., age, income, race, ethnic background,
gender, and location).
45. See id. 18 (e.g., opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and lifestyle).
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purchasing behavior.46  As a result, companies are collecting data
that is greater in both volume and level of detail; indeed, they rarely
suffer from having “too little data” about us.47
This personal information is compiled into detailed electronic
records, or “digital dossiers.”48  According to Solove, these digital
dossiers are full of basic and highly personal information in the
form of data about our daily activities: where we are, what we do,
what we like, who we are, and what we own.49  Data brokers like
ChoicePoint analyze this information, develop detailed profiles of
us, and then sell the information.  The companies that purchase
the information use it in two primary ways.
First, the availability of this personal information has revolu-
tionized the ways in which companies market their goods and ser-
vices to consumers.50  Companies use the information in our digital
dossiers to decide how they will do business with us, construct pre-
dictive models about our future behavior and consumption, and
determine what communications we will receive by mail, e-mail,
and telephone.51  Once the information has been collected directly
from consumers or purchased from a company like ChoicePoint, it
is stored in a database and analyzed to develop in-depth profiles of
current or potential customers, including customers’ likes, dislikes,
attitudes, hobbies, and habits.52  Using these profiles, companies
then identify groups, or “segments,” of customers with similar char-
acteristics and assess the types of marketing messages that will reso-
nate with members of each segment.53  Next, companies develop
their marketing messages accordingly, creating different messages
for the various segments — a practice known in marketing parlance
as “targeted” or “database” marketing — resulting in higher re-
sponse rates and a greater return on their marketing dollars.54  Of
46. See id.
47. CHOICEPOINT 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 7.
48. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
49. See id. at 1.
50. Id. at 18-19 (outlining the innovations that made database-driven marketing
“the hottest form of marketing” by 2001).
51. Id. at 3-4.
52. See id. at 18-19.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 19. See also Press Release, Direct Mktg. Ass’n, DMA CEO Unveils New
Association Brand Identity and Reveals Latest Industry Market Numbers At DMA05
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-4\NLR406.txt unknown Seq: 9  7-JUN-06 11:26
2005-2006] SEEKING PRIVACY 1039
course, in order to target their marketing messages, companies
must first have information about their customers;55 and the suc-
cess of targeted marketing creates a demand for even more, and
more detailed, data on individuals.56
The personal information contained in our digital dossiers is
also routinely used to make important financial, employment, and
other decisions about us.57  These records are used to conduct
background and credit checks on us — activities that have a very
real impact on our lives.58  Credit reports, for example, are regu-
larly relied on to evaluate a person’s financial health and serve as
the basis for decisions that financial and other institutions make
about extending credit, setting interest rates on purchases, offering
employment, renting a home, issuing licenses,59 and setting insur-
ance rates.60  Law enforcement officials use the information in gov-
ernment investigations, and still others use the information to
commit fraud and identity theft.61  Perhaps more disturbing is that
information about each of us is being swept up and compiled for
no particular reason at all, and could be used by some future, un-
known entity for purposes of which we cannot now conceive.62
(Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://www.the-dma.org/cgi/disppressrelease?article=727
(projecting that in 2005, each $1 investment in direct marketing expenditures will re-
turn an average of $11.49 of incremental revenue across all industries).
55. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 19.
56. Id. See also Bergelson, supra note 4, at 382 (explaining that “[t]he value of a
personal information database depends to a large degree on how precisely it captures a
segment of a community with well defined purchasing susceptibilities”).  In addition to
helping companies communicate more effectively with their customers, thereby increas-
ing the return on their marketing investment, the data can itself be sold to generate
additional revenue. See id.  In the truest sense of the word, then, these companies are
profiting from the personal information they collect from individuals.
57. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 21.  ChoicePoint describes its business as helping its
customers “make sense of large quantities of data” so that they can “extract the valuable
knowledge needed to make a decision” about individuals. CHOICEPOINT 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 28, at 9.
58. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 21.
59. Id.
60. See CHOICEPOINT 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 2-3.
61. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 3.
62. Solove observes that “[o]ne company has even been systematically sweeping
up all of the data available on the Internet” and storing it away. Id. at 26 (citing J.D.
Lasica, The Net NEVER Forgets, Salon, Nov. 25, 1998, http://archive.salon.com/21st/fea-
ture/1998/11/25feature.html).  Though Solove does not name names in his book, two
companies that are well-known for collecting, analyzing, buying, and selling personal
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Solove paints a compelling, and often frightening, picture of
the confluence of powerful technological and commercial forces
that has led to the development and continued growth of a lucra-
tive information-based industry, a veritable “Information Age ba-
zaar,” in which our personal data is routinely rented, bought, and
sold.63  The Internet, he says, is “the hub of the personal informa-
tion market,” in which the companies we know, and others we do
not even know exist, trade our personal data — the information
that makes up our lives and identities — like so many other
commodities.64
B. The Power Disparity
Despite the very real impact digital dossiers can have on a per-
son’s life,65 individuals have little power, voice, or meaningful par-
ticipation in the collection, compilation, and use of their personal
information.66  Solove does not accuse the collectors of having a
“diabolical motive or secret plan for domination.”67  His concern,
rather, is that they treat the information they have collected with
bureaucratic, “thoughtless” indifference.68  Those who collect and
use personal information are generally not accountable to the indi-
viduals who provided it and simply do not care about the people
whose information they are using for their own profit.69  For exam-
ple, a company can collect a person’s information without contact-
ing or notifying that person, and without that person ever finding
out that his or her information has been shared, sold, or ex-
changed.70  Even when that data is lost, stolen, or otherwise com-
data are ChoicePoint and Acxiom. See Eric Dash, Europe Zips Lips; U.S. Sells Zips, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, § 4, at 1.
63. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 19.
64. Id. at 22. See also Bergelson, supra note 4, at 382 (explaining that the expan-
sion of the personal information market resulted in the “unprecedented erosion of
individual privacy”); Litman, supra note 22, at 1285 (suggesting that “[e]ven if one
never supplied a single further datum, anyone with access to all the details could assem-
ble a frighteningly precise dossier”)
65. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 9.
66. See id. at 39. See also Litman, supra note 22, at 1286 (stating that “actual con-
trol [of one’s personal information] seems unattainable”).
67. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 41.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 102.
70. See id.
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promised, consumers still may not find out.  Only one state,
California, currently requires companies that suffer data security
breaches to notify their customers.71  But even this notification
comes too late, only after a breach has occurred.72  Without infor-
mation about or control over who has their data and how it is being
used, stored, and protected — or not protected — consumers are
rendered helpless in the face of companies that, functioning like
“large bureaucratic organization[s],” exercise control over a vast re-
cord of details about their lives, even as they are exposed to harm
such as identity theft.73
According to Solove, current privacy law74 is ill-equipped to ad-
dress the unique threats to personal privacy posed by this growing
personal data industry.75  The law, Solove notes, redresses specific
harms done to individuals, such as disclosures of secret information
and invasions “into one’s hidden world.”76  For a number of rea-
sons, he argues, the privacy problems posed by personal informa-
tion collection do not fit within this framework.77  First, the law is
concerned with specific injuries and harms, and isolated, discrete
acts.78  Yet the ongoing collection and aggregation of personal in-
formation is not the result of any specific act of one entity, but of a
“systemic” exercise of power through the combination of many
71. See Perez, supra note 12.  U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced a bill that
would require at the federal level what the California law requires: companies must
notify their customers when their personal information has been compromised. Id.
72. See Nocera, supra note 2.
73. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 9, 41.  Solove draws a compelling analogy between the
practices of companies that collect personal information and bureaucracies. See id. at
39.  For a concrete and real-life example of what happens when personal information
from one’s dossier falls into the wrong hands, and in which Solove’s analogy of the
individual at the mercy of a powerful, bureaucratic entity rings disturbingly true, see
Zeller, supra note 3 (reporting, among other things, that “data brokers told [an identity
theft victim] he could not see his dossier and that it could not be changed anyway”).
74. Solove discusses the various types of law that impact information privacy law in
some way, but emphasizes the role of the so-called “privacy torts”: intrusion upon seclu-
sion; public disclosure of private facts; false light; and appropriation. See id. at 56, 58-
61.
75. See id. at 2, 6-7, 9. See also Bergelson, supra note 4, at 383 (noting that
“[s]cholars from diverse backgrounds . . . point[ ] out that existing laws are insufficient
to protect privacy and fall far behind the developmental trajectory of information
technology”).
76. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 42, 58.
77. See id. at 61.
78. See id.
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small actions — the collection of many single pieces of data — on
the part of many actors that, individually, might otherwise appear
harmless.79  Second, the type of personal information with which
he is concerned is not necessarily secret or confidential; it has, in
fact, been disclosed (sometimes widely so) such that there is little
chance that someone’s reputation would be tarnished by the disclo-
sure of the information.80  For these reasons, among others, Solove
argues that the law does not recognize as “harms” the consequences
of the collection and use of personal information.81
Nevertheless, very real harms exist, Solove argues.82  He char-
acterizes the harm to individuals as the power disparity inherent in
individuals’ relationships with companies that collect their informa-
tion; a lack of control over how their personal information is used
to make decisions about them; and a lack of knowledge about who
has their personal information and why it is being collected or
used.83  In sum, in order to be effective, privacy, he asserts, must
carry with it the ability to “avoid the powerlessness” that occurs
when others have control of “such powerful information in one’s
life without having any say in the process.”84
C. From Foe to Friend: Converting Collectors into Fiduciaries
Solove argues that the relationships individuals have with the
companies that collect and use their personal information must be
79. See id.
80. See id. at 8, 59-61.
81. Id. at 9, 42-43.  Professor Vera Bergelson observes that, of the four groups of
privacy-related causes of action (i.e., false light, intrusion upon seclusion, public disclo-
sure of embarrassing facts, and the appropriation of name or likeness), only the last
three “could provide a basis for recovery for an unauthorized acquisition or transfer of
personal information,” but that all three “have been tested and rejected by courts in
that context.”  Bergelson, supra note 4, at 405.
82. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 51. See also Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social
Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 150 (2001) (“The threat to
personal privacy caused by the ever-expanding flow of personal data online is the most
significant public policy concern spawned by the Internet.”).
83. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 50-51.  Arthur R. Miller describes the individual’s
position vis a vis the information collector as follows:  “[w]hen the individual is deprived
of control over the information spigot, he in some measure becomes subservient to
those people and institutions who are able to gain access to it.”  Arthur R. Miller, Per-
sonal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Ori-
ented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1108 (1968-1969).
84. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 51.
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redefined.85  He proposes that the law hold those companies in a
fiduciary relationship with the individuals who have given them
their information.86  As a model for redefining that relationship, he
invokes Benjamin N. Cardozo’s famous87 description of fiduciary
obligations in Meinhard v. Salmon:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world
for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior.88
In determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists, Solove
explains, courts generally look at the following factors: degree of
kinship of the parties; disparity in the parties’ ages, health, and
mental conditions; relative education and business experience of
the parties; and the degree to which one party entrusted the han-
dling of business affairs to the other party and “reposed faith and
confidence in” that person.”89  Solove observes that most of these
factors address power or knowledge disparities between the parties
and concludes, without further analysis, that they “lean in favor of
finding a fiduciary relationship between us and the collectors and
users of our data.”90  According to Solove, this last factor —
whether one party has entrusted something to another — applies to
the relationship at issue here because people “entrust” companies
with their personal data.91  Furthermore, even if this entrustment is
85. Id. at 102.
86. Id. at 103.
87. See Ne. Gen. Corp. v. Wellington Adver., Inc., 82 N.Y.2d 158, 162 (1993); Aus-
tin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 549 (1949).
88. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 102-03 (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464
(1928)).
89. Id. at 103 (citing Pottinger v. Pottinger, 605 N.E.2d 1130, 1137 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992)).
90. Id.
91. Id.  Solove acknowledges, however, that this proposal is more problematic
when applied to third-party companies that obtain our information without having
done business with us and often without our consent or knowledge (e.g., Axciom or
ChoicePoint), since we have not explicitly or directly entrusted them with anything. See
id. at 103-04.  This review, therefore, does not address his proposal as it relates to the
relationship between the consumer and the aggregator or broker, which is one step
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not recognized, he asserts that it does not undermine his argument
because the other factors appear to “counsel so strongly” for impos-
ing fiduciary obligations on companies that collect and use our per-
sonal information.92
Solove acknowledges the “radical” nature of his proposal,93 yet
asserts that “the law is flexible and in the past has responded to new
situations,” and that it should now respond to the threats posed by
the collection of personal data by recognizing a fiduciary relation-
ship in this context.94  Redefining the relationship in those terms,
he argues, would change the legal obligations that collectors have
toward individuals, require them to act with “more care and re-
spect,”95 and, as a result, decrease the power disparity.96
III. THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS
A. Origins and Development of the Fiduciary97
Fiduciary relationships owe their origin and development to an
ancient Latin phrase and a group of thirteenth-century Franciscan
friars.  The Domesday Book appeared in England in the year 108698
and listed detailed records of landholders, tenants, and land-owner-
ship disputes.99  In it are numerous references to people holding
removed from the consumer; instead, this review analyzes his proposal only with respect
to the company that collects information directly from the consumer.
92. Id. at 104.
93. Id. at 103.
94. See id. at 103-04.
95. See id. at 104.
96. See id. at 103-04.
97. This section draws heavily from F.W. Maitland’s authoritative lectures on
Equity, delivered in the early twentieth century. See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE
OF LECTURES ON EQUITY (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d
ed. 1949) (1909).  These lectures may be the single most detailed account of the history
and genesis of fiduciary relationships.  This section also draws on L.S. Sealy’s seminal
work, Fiduciary Relationships, which appears to be the first modern attempt to survey
fiduciary law and outline a cohesive set of governing principles. See L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary
Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69.
98. See F.W. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 4 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron
Jacobstein eds., Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1970) (1897).  The Domesday Book was the great land
survey commissioned by William the Conqueror to determine the land and resources
that comprised England at the time for purposes of taxing the population. See
MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 23-24.
99. See generally ROBIN FLEMING, DOMESDAY BOOK AND THE LAW (1998) (reprinting
the Domesday Book).
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land on behalf of others.100  The word used to express this idea —
that a person could undertake to hold land on behalf of another
and for the benefit of that other person — was “use.”101  It came
from the old Latin phrase ad opus, meaning “on his behalf.”102  For
example, if you held land ad opus John, it meant that you held the
land “to the use of” John, or on John’s behalf.103  Although the
phrase may have implied, or “pointed to,” a legal relationship in
even its earliest usage, there was no law of “uses” as such and the
phrase did not confer legal status until a group of Franciscan friars
moved to Oxford, England, in the thirteenth century.104
The friars, who had arrived in Oxford as missionaries, immedi-
ately faced a problem: They needed a place to live, but they could
not own property, either individually or collectively.105  Franciscan
friars were bound by a vow of poverty that precluded them from
accumulating any possessions, property, or wealth.106  The friars
were therefore also not permitted to hold property as a group, un-
like monks in other denominations who could own property as a
community.107  Yet the friars nevertheless required a roof over their
heads.108  To solve this problem, a plot of land and a house were
conveyed to the village of Oxford “to the use of” the friars.109  Thus,
the community held the land on behalf of the friars — marking
what may have been the first time that land was permanently held
100. See MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 23.
101. MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 23-24.
102. MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 24.  In Old French, the corresponding phrase was
“al oes, ues,” which the English referred to as a “use.” Id.
103. MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 23-24.
104. See id. at 25.  The friars arrived in Oxford in 1224. See EDWARD HUTTON, THE
FRANCISCANS IN ENGLAND 1224-1538 9 (1926); D.E. SHARP, FRANCISCAN PHILOSOPHY AT
OXFORD IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY B (1930).
105. See MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 25.  For a narrative recounting the arrival of
the Franciscan friars in Oxford, see generally HUTTON, supra note 104.
106. See MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 25.
107. See id.
108. See id.  See also HUTTON, supra note 104, at 37-41, for the story of the friars’
first nights in Oxford and their search for accommodations.
109. See MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 25.  According to the History of English Law,
cited by Maitland, the grant stated that the land and house was held by the community
of the village of Oxford “ad opus fratrum” (“on behalf of the brethren”). Id.  Hutton’s
account of the friars’ arrival and settlement in Oxford confirms this, stating that some-
one named Richard le Mulliner “gave the ground and the house to the city [of Oxford]
for the use of the brethren.” HUTTON, supra note 104, at 41.
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by one group of persons to the use of (ad opus), and on behalf of,
another group of persons.110
Following this conveyance, the use was widely employed and
came to “express a substantially new relationship in connexion [sic]
with the holding of land.”111  The use was thereafter commonly uti-
lized to pass real property to one’s children,112 as well as to describe
agency and bailment relationships.113  Uses became “extremely
popular” in the fifteenth century114 and the Court of Equity began
to formally enforce them.115  In doing so, the chancellors treated
uses as analogous to estates in land, insofar as the court thought of
the use as “a sort of metaphysical entity in which there might be
estates very similar to those which could be created in land.”116  The
principle underlying enforcement of the use in equity, rather than
at law, was simple: “Men ought to fulfil [sic] their promises, their
agreements; and they ought to be compelled to do so.”117  Over
time, the terms “trust” and “confidence” were also employed to de-
scribe these circumstances and the three — use, trust, and confi-
dence — became synonymous.118
By the sixteenth century, England’s Chancery courts exercised
jurisdiction over a “great field of substantive law” comprised of such
matters, which were brought as causes of action for “breach of con-
fidence.”119  In adjudicating these cases, the chancellors did not fol-
110. See MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 25.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 26-27, 29-30.  Maitland explains that the popularity of the use as a device
for leaving property to one’s descendants could be attributed in large part to the fact
that the law imposed harsh restrictions on passing property to one’s descendants after
death, such as through a will. See id. at 26.  The use provided an alternative method for
passing property to one’s survivors that evaded the legal restrictions. See id. at 26.
113. Id. at 24.
114. Id. at  7.
115. Id. at  30.
116. Id. at  32.
117. Id. at  29.
118. See id. at 38 (explaining that “[t]o convey to A upon trust for X, this has pre-
cisely the same effect as conveying to A to the use of X”). See also Sealy, supra note 97, at
70 (“[M]any of these matters of confidence were naturally called “trusts,” whether there
was any strict trust of property or not.”).
119. See MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 7; Sealy, supra note 97, at 69.  Both Sealy and
Maitland recite an old rhyme that identified the three subject matters that first defined
the jurisdiction of the Courts of Equity: “These three give place in court of conscience,
/ Fraud, accident, and breach of confidence.” Id.  The enforcement of uses by the
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low precedent, case law, or other written authority;120 instead they
relied on a simple vocabulary of descriptive terms such as “trust”
and “confidence” and broad, general principles associated with
them.121  One chancellor deciding such a case, for example, rea-
soned that “if a confidence is reposed, and that confidence is
abused, a court of equity shall give relief.”122  This approach was
adequate, but only for a time.123
Later, starting in the second half of the sixteenth century, the
court’s jurisprudence became more settled,124 case reporting im-
proved, and the law of equity was recognized as an important
branch of law.125  As a result of these developments, a standard,
more technical approach to this area of the law took hold; concrete
rules supplanted broad principles and “precise terms” that were
“better suited to the formulation of fixed rules” replaced vague, de-
scriptive phrases.126  The word “trust,” once used broadly and sy-
nonymously with “use” and “confidence,” attained its modern,
technical meaning and usage127 in reference to relationships in
which a person, the trustee, holds title to the property of another
and is held to equitable duties arising from a manifestation to both
create such a relationship and deal with the property for the benefit
of the other person.128  Trusts thereafter have comprised a narrow
Court of Equity coincided with, and in fact contributed to, Equity’s emergence as a
court separate and apart from the courts of law. MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 6-7.
120. See MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 8.  Maitland hypothesized about the chancel-
lors’ approach to deciding these cases:
On the whole my notion is that with the idea of a law of nature in their
minds [the chancellors] decided cases without much reference to any writ-
ten authority, now making use of some analogy drawn from the common
law, and now some great maxim of jurisprudence which they have bor-
rowed from the canonists or the civilians.
Id. at 8-9.
121. See Sealy, supra note 97, at 70.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 9.
125. See id. at 10-11; Sealy, supra note 97, at 70-71.
126. Sealy, supra note 97, at 70-71.
127. Id.
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
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subset of the relationships that had previously been collectively la-
beled as “trust,” “confidence,” or “use.”129
Causes of action for breach of confidence continued to arise in
a wide variety of contexts.130  A person (A) was found to have “re-
posed confidence” in another (B) by, for example: entrusting prop-
erty to B to be held and maintained on A’s behalf (a formal
“trust”), as well as in those circumstances in which B “undertook to
exercise a power, conduct a sale, supervise an estate or business” on
behalf of A, or in some way became an agent or employee of A;
relying on B’s advice, such as when B was a professional, an expert,
or was more knowledgeable on the subject, or because B was a
trusted servant, friend, or person of “dominant character” or posi-
tion who wielded influence on A’s decisions.131
The courts struggled to distinguish these relationships from
the formal trust, at least in definition if not in obligation.132  The
words of Lord Eldon illustrate the challenge they faced:
129. See MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 36 (explaining that “it is absolutely impossible
for one to speak of trusts . . . without speaking first of uses.  For one would of course
like to answer the question — how can a trust be created? — and this unfortunately
cannot do without touching the learning of uses”); Sealy, supra note 97, at 69-72 (stat-
ing that “the whole of our law of trusts” is derived from the branch of Equity dealing
with breach of confidence).
130. Sealy, supra note 97, at 69.
131. Id.
132. Although the respective definitions of fiduciaries and trusts were unclear for
some time, the fundamental principle guiding the obligations such persons held toward
their beneficiaries was not in question: fiduciaries may not profit from their position.
Id. at 77.  In the seminal case articulating this principle, Keech v. Sandford, a “trustee”
held a lease “for the benefit of” an infant (referring to the infant as the “cestui que use
[the beneficiary of the use]”).  Keech v. Sandford, [1726] 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (Ch.).
When the landlord refused to renew the lease for the benefit of the infant, the trustee
renewed the lease in his own name. Id. The court held that:
[the trustee] should rather have let [the lease for the benefit of the infant]
run out, than to have had the lease to himself. This may seem hard, that
the trustee is the only person of all mankind who might not have the lease:
but it is very proper that rule should be strictly pursued, and not in the least
relaxed . . . .
Id.  Today, this principle still underlies the obligations of fiduciaries. See Kenneth B.
Davis, Jr., Judiciary Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking: Some Theoretical Perspectives, Part I,
80 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 1 (1985) (“Through the fiduciary device, the law seeks to create a
system of compensation and deterrence to protect the principal’s interests against ex-
ploitation which results from that divergence.”); Sealy, supra note 97, at 77.
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[T]here is a vast difference between things to which we
give the same denomination, I mean trusts.  You have a
trust expressed; you have a trust implied; you have rela-
tions formed between individuals in the matters in which
they deal with each other, in which you can hardly say
that one of them is a trustee and the other a cestui que trust
[trust beneficiary]; and yet you cannot deny, that to some
intents and some purposes one is a cestui que trust and the
other a trustee.133
Lord Eldon’s conclusion was consistent with what would become
the generally accepted view: the relationship at issue, though once
called a “trust” and resembling a trust, was merely similar to a trust,
but was nevertheless not a trust.134  What, then, of the other rela-
tionships that had also been labeled “trusts,” but which were not
quite trusts, and now had no name?135
B. The Framework for Analyzing Fiduciary Relationships
In time, the word “fiduciary” was adopted to describe those re-
lationships of “confidence” that “fell short of the now strictly-de-
fined trust.”136  That word, however, was no more than a label for
those relationships that were trust-like, were once called trusts, but
which were not, strictly speaking, “trusts.”  One definition articu-
lated around the time of its adoption was that “every remedy which
can be sought against a fiduciary is one which might be sought
against a trustee on the same grounds.”137  Yet this merely describes
what a trust and fiduciary have in common; it does not, as Sealy
133. Sealy, supra note 97, at 71 (citing Cholmondeley v. Clinton [1821] 4 Bli. 1,
96)).
134. See Sealy, supra note 97, at 71.
135. See id. According to early case reports, there was a great deal of uncertainty at
the time as to whether those relationships could still be called “trusts.” Id.
136. See id. at 71-72.  Prior to the adoption of the term “fiduciary,” such relation-
ships were referred to as quasi-trusts and constructive trusts, reflecting their trust-like or
nearly-trust nature. See MAITLAND, supra note 97, at 80; Sealy, supra note 97, at 71. The
word “fiduciary” is derived from the Latin words “fides,” meaning “faith,” and “fiducia,”
meaning “trust.” GARY WATT, TRUSTS AND EQUITY 323 n.2 (2003).
137. Sealy, supra note 97, at 72-73 (quoting Re West of England and South Wales
District Bank, ex p. Dale & Co. [1879] 11 Ch. D. 772, 778).
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pointed out, help us recognize whether any given relationship is
fiduciary in nature.138
“Fiduciary” is still used, to some extent, in an indefinite
sense,139 at least to the degree that the word “fiduciary” does not
define a single class of relationships governed by a fixed set of
rules.140  In its most basic sense, a fiduciary is defined as “a person
who undertakes to act in the interest of another person,”141 and
does so willingly in the context of certain pre-defined relation-
ships.142  Relationships recognized as fiduciary,143 in addition to the
trustee-trustor relationship,144 include those between guardian and
ward,145 agent and principal,146 attorney and client,147 corporate di-
rectors148 or officers and the corporation’s shareholders, as well as
between business partners,149 physicians and their patients,150 and,
in some cases, between controlling and minority shareholders of a
138. See id. at 73. Id. at 72 (stating that most authorities of the day were similarly
unhelpful.).
139. See id. at 73.
140. Id.
141. Scott, supra note 87, at 540.
142. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.  The fiduciary must in some way
willingly accept this role.  See Eileen Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Meta-
phor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 905 nn.29-30
(“The potential for fiduciary liability arises only with an individual’s choice to bind
herself to the obligation.”). For purposes of tort liability, a fiduciary relationship exists
“between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for
the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation.”  RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979).
143. For a list of relationships recognized as fiduciary, see Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduci-
ary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 306-07 (1999); Tamar Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 795 (1983); Scott, supra note 89, at 541.
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2.
145. See, e.g., In re Swiecicki, 477 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. 1985).
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958) (“An agent is a fiduciary
with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.”).
147. See, e.g., In re Holland, 97 N.Y.S. 202, 202 (3d Dep’t 1906).
148. See, e.g., De Bardeleben v. Bessemer Land & Improvement Co., 37 So. 511, 515
(Ala. 1903) (“Directors . . . of a corporation . . . are subject to the rules which apply
generally to persons standing in fiduciary relations.”); Lyons v. Webster, 73 So. 339
(Ala. 1916) (finding that the relationship of promoters and directors of a corporation
to the corporation was of a fiduciary nature).
149. See  e.g., Meinhard, 249 N.Y. 458 (Cardozo, C.J.).
150. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (D.
Ohio 1965).
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corporation.151  Legal scholars have identified four basic situations
in which fiduciary relationships generally arise.152  Professor Eileen
Scallen describes them as follows:153 (1) a status relationship in
which one person has legal title and/or control over the property
of another; (2) a reliance relationship in which one party reposes
trust and confidence in, or relies on, the other; (3) an entrustment
relationship in which one party has conferred power on another
party, thereby requiring the entrusted party to exercise discretion
over the entrusting party’s financial or other well-being; and (4) an
assumption-of-duty relationship in which a person undertakes to act
in the interest of another.154
The analysis courts use to determine whether a fiduciary rela-
tionship exists between two parties is deeply grounded in analogical
reasoning,155 an approach that is perhaps a legacy of the fiduciary’s
roots in Courts of Equity.156  Courts asked to find a fiduciary rela-
151. See, e.g., Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 120 A. 486, 491
(Del. Ch. 1923) (stating that “in a proper case,” the law will recognize majority stock-
holders of a company as fiduciaries to minority stockholders, and citing supporting
cases).
152. Sealy, supra note 97, at 74 (observing that “the authorities seem to suggest that
there are four categories of fiduciary relationship”). These categories often overlap
such that a single relationship may fall into one or more of the categories.  See Deborah
A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Sealy,
supra note 97, at 79-81.  For example, Sealy points out that a guardian-ward relationship
may fall into all four categories, that an attorney-client relationship could be located in
three, and that agents “will always” be placed in the entrustment category, but some-
times also in the status category.  Sealy, supra note 97, at 79-80.
153. Scallen’s categorization is the most helpful and incorporates theories asserted
by other scholars in the area. See Scallen, supra note 142, at 914 n.70.  Sealy, too, recog-
nizes four categories of fiduciary relationships, but does so without Scallen’s descriptive
labels. See Sealy, supra note 97, at 74, 76-78 (referring to the four types of fiduciary
relationships as Category I, II, III, and IV).
154. See Scallen, supra note 142, at 914. The categories, it should be noted, are
imperfect and have shortcomings, as both Scallen and Sealy point out. Id; Sealy, supra
note 97, at 79-81.  For purposes of this review, however, it is sufficient to simply identify
these basic categories as a way to locate Solove’s collector-provider relationship within
the universe of fiduciary relationships generally.  Others have the task of providing the
much-needed clarity and cohesion. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 143, at 797 (advocating
for the recognition of fiduciaries as a group and the treatment of the law that governs
them as “a distinct body of policies, principles, and rules”).
155. See DeMott, supra note 152, at 891 (observing that the law governing fiduciary
obligations illustrates, more so than other areas of the law, “the power of analogy in
legal argumentation”).
156. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 1 (1975).
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tionship in a new context will first identify a relationship that the
law already recognizes as having fiduciary status.157  Using that rela-
tionship as a model for analyzing the relationship at issue,158 the
courts will next evaluate whether the instant relationship is suffi-
ciently like the model relationship to support recognizing it as fidu-
ciary.159  The law of fiduciary relations is, above all, “situation-
specific” and drawing analogies to existing relationships must be
“the starting point for any further analysis.”160  Only upon finding
that a fiduciary relationship exists will courts impose fiduciary obli-
gations on the parties, again extending by analogy the obligations
157. DeMott, supra note 152, at 891. DeMott also explains that “[c]ourts consider-
ing whether to impose a fiduciary constraint in a novel context rely heavily on compari-
sons to more conventional contexts in which the constraint does apply,” and that this
comparison is “an inevitable aspect of fiduciary analysis.”  DeMott, supra note 152, at
879. It should be noted that the categorization of fiduciary relationships noted above is
solely the work of legal academics and scholars.  Courts do not engage in this exercise
and the categories play no role in the judicial analysis of relationships that are pur-
ported to be fiduciary in nature.
158. Some scholars refer to the model relationship as a “prototype” or “paradigm”
relationship. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 143, at 804 (“prototype”); DeMott, supra note
152, at 879 (“paradigm”).
159. See, e.g., Swiecicki, 477 N.E.2d, 490 (finding that “[t]he relationship between
guardian and ward is equivalent to that between a trustee and a beneficiary . . . [t]hus,
in the instant case, the defendant as guardian had the duty to manage the ward’s prop-
erty with the same degree of vigilance, diligence and prudence as a reasonable man
would use in managing his own property”) (citations omitted); See Ne. Gen. Corp., 82
N.Y.2d at 162-63 (finding that the function of an investment advisor was not sufficiently
like that of a broker, who has fiduciary duties, to support finding a fiduciary relation-
ship between the advisor and advisee); Mary Szto, Limited Liability Company Morality:
Fiduciary Duties in Historical Context, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 61, 68 (2004) (noting that
courts, when defining the standards for fiduciary duties in the context of limited liabil-
ity companies, draw analogies to partnership and corporate law).
160. See DeMott, supra note 152, at 879. While this case-by-case approach may be
adequate for resolving individual disputes, it “has not . . . been appropriate for the
elucidation of the broader problems of policy which underlie the whole fiduciary con-
cept.”  Weinrib, supra note 156, at 1 (criticizing the approach as “piecemeal”).  Thus,
this area of the law still lacks uniformity, cohesion, and clarity. See id.; Robert Flanni-
gan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 286 (1989) (observing that
judicial and academic conclusions relating to fiduciary status “have been tentative,” and
that the law in this area “remains obscure”); Frankel, supra note 143, at 795-96 (observ-
ing that examining fiduciary relationships as a whole is complicated by “the fact that the
various types of fiduciaries have evolved over the centuries”); Sealy, supra note 97, at 69
(noting that what had previously been written about fiduciary relationships “is not usu-
ally very full or precise”).
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associated with the model relationship to the newly recognized
relationship.161
IV. THE FIDUCIARY SOLUTION: WHY “RADICAL” ISN’T RIGHT
Solove’s proposal that collectors of personal information
should be held to act with “the punctilio of an honor the most sen-
sitive” as to the information they collect and the providers of that
information162 may seem an appealing antidote to the significant
privacy threats posed by the collection and aggregation of personal
data.163  And Solove is no doubt right about the need for a solution,
as the data breaches of the past year clearly demonstrate.164  Yet a
careful review of his argument reveals that it fails to justify the im-
position of fiduciary status on such relationships for three reasons.
First, Solove’s argument is inconsistent with the way courts analyze
relationships to determine whether they are fiduciary in nature.
Second, his proposal would convert nearly every buyer-seller trans-
action into a fiduciary relationship, effectively eviscerating the well-
established boundary between arm’s length business transactions
161. See Frankel, supra note 143, at 804.  Also important to note is that the party
seeking relief on the grounds that a fiduciary relationship existed has the burden of
pleading and proving its existence by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Pottinger
v. Pottinger, 605 N.E.2d 1130 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
162. If collectors are recognized as being in fiduciary relationships with the provid-
ers, the collectors would be required to satisfy some set of fiduciary obligations.  It is not
at all clear, however, what those obligations would be.  Just as there is no one-size-fits-all
definition of what constitutes a fiduciary relationship, there is also no single set of fidu-
ciary obligations that are uniformly conferred upon all fiduciaries. See Victor Brudney,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.L. REV. 595, 595 (1997) (“The re-
straints on the fiduciary’s self-benefiting behavior that attend the finding of the fiduci-
ary relationship are not the same in each category or indeed in all contexts within any
category.  The same is true for sanctions imposed for violating such fiduciary obliga-
tions.”); Scott, supra note 78, at 541 (noting that “[s]ome fiduciary relationships are
undoubtedly more intense than others” and that “all . . . fiduciaries . . . are subject to
the fiduciary principle of loyalty, although not to the same extent”).  An important
principle underpinning the recognition of fiduciary obligations is that a person found
to be a fiduciary “incurs duties designed to put detail into the idea of ‘serve the interests
of another.’” SIMON GARDNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS 145 (2d ed.
2003).  We could therefore only make a general prediction that the collectors of infor-
mation would to some degree be required to serve the privacy interests of individuals.
163. Fiduciary principles teach a lesson of loyalty that is otherwise lacking in the
“workaday mundane marketplace” and all too absent from the personal information
marketplace. See Ne. Gen. Corp., 82 N.Y.2d at 162 (quoting Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 464).
164. See supra notes 2-37 and accompanying text. R
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and fiduciary relations.  Lastly, his claim that fiduciary law is flexible
enough to apply to this situation is unfounded.
A. Fiduciary Analysis Gone Awry
Solove’s argument ignores the traditional analytical framework
outlined above or, at least, applies a somewhat backward version of
it.  First he identifies the obligations he wishes to impose on the
collectors of personal information, and then he argues that the col-
lector-provider relationship is sufficiently like already-recognized fi-
duciary relationships to warrant similar status.165  He begins his
argument by asserting that companies that collect personal infor-
mation should be held to the fiduciary obligations so forcefully de-
scribed by Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon.166  To quote Meinhard,
however, is to merely restate well-established principles about the
obligations that result once a fiduciary relationship is found to ex-
ist; doing so does not articulate analytical principles by which the
law recognizes a fiduciary relationship between two parties.167  In-
deed, scholars have cautioned that the mere statement that some-
one is in a fiduciary relationship with another means nothing more
than that some aspects of the relationship may resemble that of a
fiduciary;168 such a statement does not itself compel the conclusion
that fiduciary principles or duties should be applied.169  Rather, the
nature of the relationship must be such that it “justifies the interfer-
ence.”170  Solove’s argument, therefore, begs the question: Is the
relationship at issue here — between individuals and the compa-
nies that collect personal information from them — of a fiduciary
nature such that it gives rise to the fiduciary obligations he wants to
165. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 102-03.
166. Id. at 102-03 (citing Meinhard, 249 N.Y. 458).
167. See Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. Fed. Elec. Co., 236 N.Y.S. 692, 698 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1929).
168. See Sealy, supra note 97, at 73 (“[T]he mere statement that John is in a fiduci-
ary relationship towards me means no more than that in some respects his position is
trustee-like.”).
169. See Sealy, supra note 97, at 73.
170. Id. (quoting Coomber v. Coomber, 1 Ch. 723, 728 (1911) (Moulton, L.J.)).
Sealy notes that L.J. Moulton cautioned against “the danger of trusting to verbal formu-
lae.” Id. See also Ne. Gen. Corp, 82 N.Y.2d at 163 (stating that whether a fiduciary duty
exists is not determined by “nomenclature,” but by the “services agreed to under the
contract between the parties”).
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impose?  A comparison of the collector-provider relationship to the
relationships Solove employs in his argument reveals that it is not.
1. Meinhard v. Salmon
The Meinhard case involved the relationship between two busi-
ness partners, Walter Salmon and Morton Meinhard, who had en-
tered into a joint venture to develop and manage a piece of prime
New York City real estate.171  They went into business together to
convert the Hotel Bristol, located at 42nd Street and 5th Avenue,
into shops and offices.172  Under the terms of their agreement,
Meinhard was to pay half of the costs for reconstructing, managing,
and operating the property, and Salmon was to pay Meinhard a per-
centage of the net profits generated.173  The lease for the property,
however, was in Salmon’s name only.174  In addition, the agreement
conferred sole power on Salmon for the leasing, management, and
operation of the building, and provided that any losses would be
shared equally by the parties.175  Near the end of the lease, Salmon
surreptitiously entered into a new long-term lease with the property
owner, covering not only the original tract, but five additional
tracts, including one that adjoined the Hotel Bristol lot.176  These
lease terms called for the existing buildings, including the Bristol,
to be torn down and replaced by a new.177  Meinhard was not aware
of these building negotiations or the executed lease; he only
learned of it after the lease had been signed,178 whereupon he sued
Salmon for breach of a fiduciary duty.179
Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals,
determined that as “coadventurers” Salmon and Meinhard were
171. 249 N.Y. at 461-62.  For further discussion of the Meinhard case, see also Scott,
supra note 87, at 548-49.
172. 249 N.Y. at 461-62.
173. Id. at 462.  The agreement called for Salmon to pay Meinhard 40% of the
profits for the first five years of the lease and 50% of the profits thereafter. Id.
174. Id. at 461.
175. Id. at 462.
176. Id. at 462-63.
177. Id. at 463.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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analogous to “copartners”180 and, therefore, subject to the fiduciary
obligations imposed upon partners and trustees,181  including a
duty of the “finest loyalty.”182  The aspects of Salmon’s relationship
with Meinhard that set it apart from those of the “workaday
world”183 that the two were business partners in a joint venture,
were together through “fair weather or foul” and “for better or
worse,”184 and that Salmon was the managing agent of the ven-
ture.185  In that capacity, the court noted, Salmon had exclusive au-
thority to operate the business, as well as the power to abscond with
the assets of the venture.186
A New York court interpreting Meinhard just one year after it
was decided held that a party seeking to apply the principles articu-
lated in Meinhard must first show that an agreement between the
two parties was, in fact, a “joint adventure.”187  The court further
cautioned that, even upon finding a joint adventure, the fiduciary
obligations articulated in Meinhard do not arise automatically since
the duties of the parties to a joint adventure are likely to be limited
by the terms of the agreement.188  This approach is consistent with
how courts today generally decide whether a fiduciary relationship
exists,189 and further highlights the problems with Solove’s out-of-
order analysis.
The relationship Solove wishes to recognize as fiduciary in na-
ture is, even on its face, far different from the one described in
Meinhard, which he sets forth as his model relationship.  In Mein-
hard, the men were business partners, which means that they were
180. Id.  Cardozo also refers to Salmon and Meinhard as “joint adventurers,” but
without defining the term. Id. In an earlier case, Jones v. Walker, the court defined a
joint adventure as “a limited partnership, not limited in a statutory sense as to liability
but as to scope and duration, and, under our law, joint adventures and partnerships are
governed by the same rules.”  101 N.Y.S. 22 (N.Y. App. Term 1906).
181. 249 N.Y. at 464.  This relationship would appear to fall into Scallen’s “entrust-
ment” category. See note 142 and accompanying text.
182. Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 463-64.
183. Id. at 464.
184. Id. at 462.
185. Id. at 468. Cardozo noted that Salmon was “much more than a coadventurer.
He was a managing coadventurer.” Id.
186. Id. at 466.
187. See Claude Neon Lights, 236 N.Y.S. at 697 (applying Meinhard, 249 N.Y. 458).
188. See id. at  697-98.
189. See text accompanying notes 157-61.
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“carry[ing] on as co-owners a business for profit.”190  In contrast,
the parties in the relationship with which Solove is concerned are
not co-owners in a business and do not seek profits together; far
from it.  They have not entered into a partnership arrangement of
any kind, or a relationship that remotely resembles one.  As buyer
and seller, they are merely parties to an ordinary commercial trans-
action.  Even when an individual has actively established a relation-
ship with a company, the relationship is not much more than that
of strangers, as Solove himself acknowledges.191  This relationship,
therefore, fails to satisfy even a threshold requirement for finding a
fiduciary status under Meinhard.192
2. Pottinger v. Pottinger 193
Solove’s reliance on an Illinois case involving an elderly woman
whose relatives defrauded her does not save his argument.  In that
case, Ida Werner, 93, had entered into an installment contract with
Mr. and Mrs. Pottinger, Werner’s nephew and his wife, whereby
they purchased Werner’s farm and agreed to pay taxes on the prop-
erty while Werner retained a life estate interest in one of the prop-
erty’s residences.194  Werner later brought suit against the
Pottingers, claiming that they breached their fiduciary duties to her
when they took her money and wrote themselves checks that were
drawn on her account.195
In evaluating whether a fiduciary relationship existed between
Werner and the Pottingers, the court stated that a fiduciary rela-
tionship may arise “where trust and confidence, by reason of friend-
ship, agency and experience, are reposed by one person in another
so the latter gains influence and superiority over the former” and
proceeded to articulate the factors Solove applies to the collector-
provider information: degree of kinship of the parties; disparity in
the parties’ ages, health, and mental conditions; relative education
and business experience of the parties; and the degree to which
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A.
191. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 102.
192. See Ne. Gen. Corp., 82 N.Y.2d at 162 (stating that parties to a commercial trans-
action will not be held to fiduciary duties).
193. 605 N.E.2d 1130, cited in SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 103.
194. Id. at 1133.
195. Id. at 1133-34, 1136.
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one party entrusted the handling of business affairs to the other
party and “reposed faith and confidence in” that person.196  Upon
applying these factors, however, the court held that no fiduciary re-
lationship arose between Werner and the Pottingers.197  The court
found no evidence that Werner had reposed faith and confidence
in the Pottingers “to the extent that she entrusted the handling of
her business affairs to them.”198  Mrs. Pottinger did chores around
the house for Werner and Mr. Pottinger performed maintenance at
her house.199  The parties’ blood relationship and the Pottingers’
performance of these duties for Werner was not sufficient to give
rise to a fiduciary relationship.200  The court further noted that
“one person’s assistance of another in business affairs” also does not
establish a fiduciary relationship.201
Even assuming arguendo that the Werner-Pottinger relationship
satisfied the elements pertaining to differences in the parties’ rela-
tive age, health, mental condition, education, and business experi-
ence — which, as Solove asserts, suggest power disparities between
the parties202 — the court nevertheless found that the entrustment
element was missing.203  For purposes of finding a fiduciary rela-
tionship in the collector-provider relationship, therefore, Pottinger
teaches that the entrustment element must be satisfied, and that it
must be satisfied with more than the mere handling of another’s
business or personal affairs.  The collector-provider relationship
falls significantly short of this standard.  A person who makes a
purchase and in doing so provides the seller with personal informa-
tion needed to execute the transaction — such as a credit card
number or mailing address — does not, in any conception of that
196. Id. at 1138. See also SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 103.
197. Pottinger, 605 N.E.2d at 1138.
198. Id. Several years after signing the installment contract, but before the lawsuit
arose, Werner executed a power of attorney naming Mrs. Pottinger as her attorney. Id.
at 1133.  The defendants conceded that a fiduciary relationship arose upon execution
of the power of attorney by operation of law. Id. at 1138.  Therefore, the court here was
addressing the question of whether a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties
prior to the power of attorney. Id. at 1137.
199. Id. at 1138.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 103.
203. See Pottinger, 605 N.E.2d at 1138.
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encounter, entrust the seller with the buyer’s personal or business
affairs.
B. The Arm’s Length Limits of Fiduciary Relations
It is well established that the relationship between a buyer and
a seller is not a fiduciary or trust-based relationship.204  Rather, a
buyer and seller are parties to an arm’s length transaction in which
each seeks for itself the best advantage to be derived from the trans-
action205 and acts only for its own benefit, not for the benefit of the
other.206  For this reason, an arm’s length business transaction does
not give rise to a fiduciary relationship.207  A fiduciary relationship
arises between such parties only “when, by their concerted action,
they willingly and knowingly act for one another in a manner to
impose mutual trust and confidence.”208  These two types of rela-
tions — arm’s length and fiduciary — therefore cannot co-exist in
the same relationship, by virtue of their very natures: a fiduciary is,
by definition, not dealing at arm’s length with the beneficiary, and
parties who transact at arm’s length will not be subject to fiduciary
duties.209  This principle, inherent in fiduciary doctrine since the
204. See Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea, 614 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that “[t]he relationship of a buyer to his supplier . . . does not constitute a
fiduciary or other special relationship of trust”); Claude Neon Lights, Inc., 236 N.Y.S. at
696 (holding that a company has no fiduciary relationship to another when the rela-
tionship of the parties is that of buyer and seller, not joint adventurer).
205. Sachs v. Cluett Peabody & Co., Inc., 39 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (1st Dep’t 1943).
206. See id.; Lanz v. Resolution Trust Corp., 764 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(holding that “in an arms length transaction . . . there is no duty imposed on either
party to act for the benefit or protection of the other party”).
207. See Sachs, 39 N.Y.S.2d at 856 (noting that “[p]arties dealing at arm’s length,
each seeking for himself the best advantage to be derived from a transaction, are not in
confidential [or fiduciary] relationship”).
208. Paul v. Smith, 380 P.2d 421, 426 (Kan. 1963). See also Lanz, 764 F. Supp. at 179
(stating that “the fact that one party places trust or confidence in the other does not
create a confidential relationship in the absence of some recognition, acceptance or
undertaking of the duties of a fiduciary on the part of the other party” and citing cases);
Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 462.
209. See WATT, supra note 136, at 325 (observing that parties dealing at arm’s
length may be bound by an implied duty of good faith toward each other, but “will
rarely be subject to an implied fiduciary duty to put the interests of the other party
first”); Scott, supra note 87, at 541 (“The relationship between the parties [who are in a
fiduciary relationship] is very different from that between parties dealing with each
other at arm’s length.”).
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friars arrived in Oxford in 1224,210 acts as a limit on the recognition
and enforcement of fiduciary relationships.
In Northeast General Corp. v. Wellington Advertising, Inc., the New
York Court of Appeals, sixty-five years after its landmark decision in
Meinhard, criticized those who would apply Meinhard’s principles in
a way that would encroach upon arm’s length transactions.211  In-
deed, the court defined the limits of fiduciary relationships in di-
rect reference to arm’s length transactions, holding that when a
party to an ordinary commercial transaction is not functioning as
an agent, partner, or “coventurer,” the recognition of a fiduciary
duty “extends too far”:212
Probing our precedents and equitable principles un-
earths no supportable justification for such a judicial in-
terposition, however highly motivated and idealistic.
Indeed, responding to this fine instinct would inappropri-
ately propel the courts into reformation of service agree-
ments between commercially knowledgeable parties in
this and perhaps countless other situations and transac-
tions as well.213
The court did not, however, find that such parties are without
any protection at all.214  It found that they may themselves create a
relationship of “higher trust” when the court will not do it for
them.215  And if they choose not to take on greater obligations for
the other party’s benefit, they must rely on the customs and prac-
tices of the marketplace216 — of which, the court noted, there is
nothing “inherently objectionable.”217
210. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
211. 82 N.Y.2d 158 (addressing whether an investment advisor, or “finder,” stood in
a fiduciary relationship with a company for whom the finder had agreed to identify an
acquirer).
212. Id. at 162 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, “Cardozo’s Foot”: The Chancellor’s Con-
science and Constructive Trusts, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1993)).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. (“[C]ourts should not ordinarily transport [the parties to a commonplace
commercial transaction] to the higher realm of relationship and fashion the stricter
duty for them.”).
216. See id. at 160.
217. Id. (citing Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, reprinted in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 152 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947)).
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The relationships with which Solove is concerned are classic
arm’s length transactions.218  And the fact that such a transaction
involves the exchange of personal information should not convert
the relationship from one of parties dealing at arm’s length into a
fiduciary relationship that requires the seller to place the buyer’s
interests above its own.  First, as noted above, the law has never rec-
ognized personal information as giving rise to a fiduciary relation-
ship.219  Historically, fiduciary relationships involved the exercise of
power over another’s property, money, business or legal affairs, or
ownership interests.220  The law does not recognize personal infor-
mation as property or as something in which an individual has an
ownership interest.221
Second, even assuming that personal information could serve
as the basis for a fiduciary relationship, the buyer has not — by
merely handing over personal information as part of a  purchase —
“entrusted” anything to the seller in the way that this term is used in
fiduciary law.  “Entrustment” relationships exist when a person has
“conferred power on another party” to act on that person’s behalf,
“thereby requiring the entrusted party to exercise discretion over
the entrusting party’s financial or other well-being.”222  The buyer
218. The relationship which is the subject of Solove’s proposal exists between a
company as seller and one of its customers as a buyer of some good or service offered
by the company.  This discussion assumes that the provision of personal information is
the only basis on which this relationship might be deemed fiduciary, and that there is
no other independent aspect of the relationship that would otherwise create a fiduciary
relationship. See SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 102-04.
219. See Flannigan, supra note 160, at 285. See generally Sealy, supra note 97.
220. See Sealy, supra note 97, at 69.
221. See Samuelson, supra note 43, at 1131-32.  Professor Samuelson explains that
“[i]t may seem natural for individuals to assume that they do or should own data about
themselves” because the law protects individuals against misuse or disclosure of their
personal data. Id. at 1130-31.  Nevertheless, that protection “has not historically been
grounded on a perception that people have property rights in personal data as such.”
Id.  In American law, such information traditionally “cannot be owned by any person.”
Id. at 1131.  Individuals therefore have no legal right, for example, to prohibit compa-
nies from “marketing their personal data to other firms based on information that the
individuals disclosed on a product warranty card sent to manufacturers of that prod-
uct.” Id. at 1131-32.  Professor Jessica Litman argues that a property-based model is not
only inadequate to protect our personal information, but could create more problems
than it would solve: “The market in personal data is the problem.  Market solutions
based on a property rights model won’t cure it; they’ll only legitimize it.”  Litman, supra
note 22, at 1301.
222. See supra text accompanying note 154. R
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has not conferred such power on the seller because the seller does
not hold the information on behalf of the buyer for the purpose of
using the information to represent the buyer’s interests in any way.
Instead, the personal information — such as a credit card number
or other payment information, name, address, etc. — is necessary
for the seller to be able to complete the transaction because, with-
out this information, the buyer would, for example, not be able to
provide the seller with consideration for the bargain, or the seller
might have no way to deliver the goods.  For a relationship to be
deemed fiduciary, however, more is required; one party must un-
dertake to act in the interests of another.223  By receiving information
that is necessary or incidental to the completion of an ordinary
commercial transaction, the seller has not undertaken to act on be-
half of or in the interests of the buyer.  This exchange of personal
information is therefore insufficient to create a fiduciary relation-
ship between the two parties.
Third, there are many circumstances in which personal infor-
mation is provided not because it is necessary to complete the trans-
action, but for other reasons, such as when consumers hand over
their e-mail addresses or information about their product prefer-
ences.  In these cases, consumers typically receive something in re-
turn from the collector, such as personalized information about
products and services that match their interests, whether delivered
via a website, e-mail, mail, or otherwise.  Here, the provision of in-
formation is part of a voluntary bargain and individuals assume
some risk in giving it up.224
223. See Scott, supra note 87, at 540.
224. Professor Litman explains that consumers are on notice to these information
collection practices:
Sometime in the past dozen or so years, most of us became gradually aware
of the fact that businesses were collecting information about us to use in
marketing products to us.  That check cashing card we’d applied for at the
supermarket in order to write checks for groceries gave the supermarket
the ability to track our purchases; when supermarkets began accepting
credit cards, that gave them the same ability.  The sweater we ordered from
a catalog arrived in the mail along with umpteen new glossy catalogs for
people who wear sweaters.  That cooking magazine we subscribed to
seemed to show up along with a score of apparently independent special
offers for folks interested in cooking.
Litman, supra note 22, at 1285.
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Solove’s proposal raises other practical, if not theoretical, ques-
tions.  If a buyer-seller relationship were deemed fiduciary simply
because personal information is exchanged, what class of commer-
cial relations would not be subject to fiduciary status and obliga-
tions?  Solove does not offer any limiting principles that would
achieve his goal of protecting personal information without under-
mining the law’s long-established approach of non-interference in
such relations.  Instead, his proposal effectively eviscerates the very
notion of arm’s length dealing and renders limitless the reach of
fiduciary relations.  This is what makes his solution unworkable
and, in Solove’s own words, so “radical.”225
C. Dispelling the Illusion of Flexibility
Solove acknowledges the challenge of finding a fiduciary rela-
tionship between collectors and providers of personal information,
yet asserts — without supporting authority — that the law is flexible
in responding to new situations and should be flexible in recogniz-
ing a fiduciary relationship here.226  He finds this flexibility in
Swerhun v. General Motors Corp., in which the court stated that courts
“have carefully refrained from defining instances of fiduciary rela-
tionships in such a manner that other and perhaps new cases might
be excluded.”227  The Swerhun court’s full statement reads:
It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that
the principle [of fiduciary relations] extends to every pos-
sible case in which a fiduciary relation exists as a fact, in
which there is confidence reposed on one side and the
resulting superiority and influence on the other.  The re-
lation and the duties involved in it need not be legal.  It
may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal . . . It
has been said that [a fiduciary relationship] exists, and
that relief is granted, in which influence has been ac-
quired and abused—in which confidence has been re-
posed and betrayed.  The origin of the confidence and
the source of the influence are immaterial.  The rule em-
braces both technical fiduciary relations and those infor-
225. SOLOVE, supra note 1, at 103.
226. Id. at 104 (citing no authority).
227. Id. at 103 (citing Swerhun v. Gen. Motors Corp., 812 F. Supp. 1218 (M.D. Fla.
1993)).
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mal relations which exist whenever one [person] trusts in
and relies upon another.  The only question is, Does such
a relation in fact exist?228
At most, Swerhun appears only on its face to state a flexible
standard for finding fiduciary relationships.  Any suggestion that it
provides a basis for recognizing a new category, however, is mis-
guided and the result of a superficial reading of the case and a mis-
understanding of fiduciary law.  A close reading of the above quote
undermines Solove’s argument.  The court is merely stating that it
will not fail to recognize a relationship as fiduciary when the facts
show that a fiduciary relationship actually exists and when the rela-
tionship at issue is one of the traditional fiduciary relationships.229
The court’s language does not suggest, as Solove would suggest,
that any relationship may be recognized as fiduciary.  Quite the op-
posite.  The court makes clear that the facts must support finding a
fiduciary relationship, reminding us where the heart of the matter
lies when it states that “[t]he only question is, Does such a relation
in fact exist?”230  Furthermore, the court also makes clear that the
relationship at issue must be one of the traditional types of fiduciary
relationships in order to be deemed fiduciary.  The court defines a
fiduciary relationship as one in which “there is confidence re-
posed”231 and goes on to use the word “confidence” three times, as
well as “trusts” and a form of “relies.”232  As we have seen in the
origins and development of fiduciary law,233 these are descriptors
for an already recognized set of fiduciary relations.  They not only
describe Scallen’s “reliance” category,234 but the very first fiduciary
relationship recognized by the law, one in which “confidence is re-
posed.”235  The court is not breaking new ground; it is merely fol-
lowing the well-trodden path of five hundred years of fiduciary
law.236
228. Swerhun, 812 F. Supp. at 1222-23 (internal citations omitted).
229. See id.
230. Id. at 1223.  The court’s approach is consistent with the analytical approach
explained in Part III.B.
231. Swerhun, 812 F. Supp. at 1222.
232. Id. at 1222-23.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 97-135.
234. See Scallen, supra note 142.
235. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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The court’s statement that “the relation and duties . . . need
not be legal,” but may instead be “moral, social, domestic, or merely
personal”237 merely refers to the fact that a fiduciary duty need not
arise out of a contract-based relationship, and is consistent with the
categories of fiduciary relationships outlined above.238  The refer-
ence to a “moral” source of fiduciary relationships cannot be taken
as an invitation to expand the doctrine to this context.  Professor
Deborah A. DeMott observes that courts routinely employ words of
moral obligation when discussing fiduciary relationships and obli-
gations,239 explaining that:
[i]n establishing that the imposition of fiduciary obliga-
tion in a particular situation conforms to moral intuition,
courts may be responding to the situation-specific quality
of the obligation.  They may also be responding to the
stringency of the standards for assessing a fiduciary’s be-
havior, as well as to the high social value placed on
trust.240
There are still two further considerations that caution against
such a broad and sweeping interpretation.  First, courts themselves
have simply not interpreted or applied Swerhun’s language as
broadly as Solove suggests. Swerhun has only been cited by two
cases and neither provides support for the argument that courts
would, or should, embrace Solove’s expansive view of fiduciary rela-
tionships.  In Amoco Oil Co. v. Gomez, the district court cited Swerhun
for no more than the requirement that the party seeking to estab-
lish a fiduciary relationship must provide “substantial evidence” of
such a relationship.241  In Estate of Ayres v. Beaver, the district court
never even reached the issue of whether a fiduciary relationship
existed because it concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion to hear the claim.242  The court only noted that that there was
237. Swerhun, 812 F. Supp. at 1223.
238. See supra Part III.A-B.
239. See DeMott, supra note 152, at 891. Examples of courts employing moral lan-
guage in reference to fiduciary relations or obligations can be found in Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 281 (Del. 1939), and, of course, Meinhard, 249 N.Y. at 464, and its many
progeny.
240. DeMott, supra note 152, at 891-92.
241. 125 F. Supp.2d 492, 510 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
242. 48 F. Supp.2d 1335, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
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“a possibility” that the plaintiff could prove a cause of action based
on a breach of fiduciary duty.243
Second, Swerhun’s application is greatly limited by the authori-
ties on which it relies.  A review of the three cases the Swerhun court
cites as support for its seemingly broad language reveals that the
relationships recognized as fiduciary in those cases do not re-
present departures from the traditional conceptions of fiduciary re-
lationships.  Indeed, the relationships fall squarely within the
traditional categories of fiduciary relationships;244 two of the cases
address joint venture relationships and the third addresses a rela-
tionship in which a bank “exercised absolute de facto control” over
its depositors’ corporate enterprise.245  In the leading case, Quinn v.
Phipps, the court found a relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween a real estate broker and the principal on whose behalf the
broker was to make and negotiate an offer to purchase a piece of
land from a third party.246  The real estate broker, the court rea-
soned, invited the confidence of the plaintiff.247  Just as Justice Car-
dozo emphasized the special relationship between the co-
adventurers in Meinhard, the court in Quinn emphasized the height-
ened professional responsibilities attending real estate brokers be-
cause they are “the medium through which annually many millions
of dollars in earnings and savings are secured or invested.”248  Fur-
thermore, Quinn is weak authority for applying Swerhun as broadly
as Solove advocates.  None of the cases following Quinn have recog-
nized fiduciary relationships outside of the traditional categories.249
243. Id. at 1341.
244. See Scallen, supra note 142, at 914, and Sealy, supra note 97, at 74.
245. See Garner v. Pearson, 545 F. Supp. 549, 557 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (finding that the
defendants, who were shareholders of a bank, were in a fiduciary relationship with the
bank and its depositors because the defendants exercised dominion over the entire
corporate enterprise at all relevant times, and citing Quinn v. Phipps); Quinn v. Phipps,
113 So. 419 (Fla. 1927); Browning v. Peyton, 918 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding
issues of fact as to whether a fiduciary relationship existed between parties to an alleged
joint venture).
246. Quinn, 113 So. 419.
247. Id. at 422-23.
248. See id. at 425.
249. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Mundon Hill Farms, Inc., 150 So. 233 (Fla. 1933) (involv-
ing constructive trust of real property); Tillman v. Pitt Cole Co., 82 So. 2d 672 (Fla.
1955) (involving constructive trust of real property); Cannova v. Carran, 92 So. 2d 614,
620 (Fla. 1957) (addressing, inter alia, existence of a joint adventure).  Additionally,
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Thus, Swerhun’s reference to “moral, social, domestic, or merely
personal” relationships as sources of fiduciary status merely points
to those relationships that courts already recognize as fiduciary.  It
does not, as Solove suggests, create new categories, nor does it au-
thorize a blank check with which courts may recognize new fiduci-
ary relationships or expand the doctrine of fiduciary law.
The traditional approach to recognizing fiduciary relationships
is, admittedly, not without critics.250  Tamar Frankel and Robert
Flannigan have suggested that the role of fiduciary relations in soci-
ety, as well as fiduciary law generally, is growing in importance and
that this may in turn spark changes in the way courts recognize fidu-
ciary relations.251  Frankel asserts that “fiduciary law is becoming
more important as it responds to basic changes in our society” and
that lawmaking bodies “increasingly draw on fiduciary law to answer
problems caused by . . . social changes.”252  At the same time, he
argues, the current analogical approach to fiduciary law is “unsatis-
factory because the analogies frequently do not result in appropri-
ate rules.”253  Flannigan observes that throughout the British
Commonwealth, interest in fiduciary obligations is growing and is
“forcing the courts to begin to grapple with some very fundamental
issues in the area.”254  Such predictions about the prospects for
change in this area of the law may very well prove true some day.
For now, however, the recognition of fiduciary relationships is still
solidly anchored in analogy-based reasoning and a new analytical
framework has yet to emerge.255  For these reasons, Solove’s asser-
tion that fiduciary law is flexible enough to recognize new fiduciary
relationships is unsupported or, at least, premature.
Quinn is generally not followed outside of Florida.  Shepard’s Reports reveals only 219
citing references for Quinn, of which all but sixty-four were Florida cases.  This is com-
pared to over 1,600 citing references for Meinhard throughout jurisdictions nationwide.
Meinhard, decided the year after Quinn, is the leading case on fiduciary relationships
and obligations within corporate law and has been followed much more widely than
Quinn. See, e.g., J.A.C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders’ Fiduci-
ary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 11 n.2 (1987).
250. See Frankel, supra note 143, at 797.
251. See id.; Flannigan, supra note 160, at 285-86.
252. Frankel, supra note 143, at 797.
253. Id.
254. Flannigan, supra note 160, at 285-86.
255. See DeMott, supra note 152, at 891 (noting that although this approach may be
“unsatisfying,” it is pervasive, persistent, and an inevitable part of the analysis).
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V. CONCLUSION
Recent data breaches have highlighted the disturbing privacy
problems resulting from the burgeoning personal information mar-
ketplace and the lack of protections available to safeguard our per-
sonal information.  In response to these developments, Solove is
right to argue that the customs of the marketplace alone are not
adequate to protect our personal information privacy, and that
something more is needed.  But that “something more” cannot be
the recognition of a fiduciary relationship between companies that
collect personal information and the individuals who provide the
information.  Applying fiduciary law to the collector-provider rela-
tionship here would find no fiduciary at all.  Furthermore, the im-
position of fiduciary status in this context would convert nearly
every buyer-seller transaction into a fiduciary relationship, thereby
eliminating the very concept of arm’s length dealing.
This is not to say that companies that collect personal informa-
tion should be free of any obligations regarding the protection of
that information, or that those companies should have no duty
whatsoever to the individuals who provide their personal informa-
tion in the course of a transaction.  It is simply to acknowledge, as
Solove fails to do, that the theoretical existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship cannot be considered apart from the practical implications
of its enforcement.256
256. See Davis, supra note 123, at 3.
